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I. INTRODUCTION
THE shareholder empowerment movement (movement or the move-ment),1 driven primarily by public pension funds and union related
* Bernard S. Sharfman is an associate fellow of the R Street Institute, a
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law
(spring 2018), a former Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (spring 2013 and 2014), and a member of the Journal of
Corporation Law’s editorial advisory board.  Mr. Sharfman would like to thank
Adam Epstein (Founder, Third Creek Advisors, LLC), Alex Pollack (distinguished
senior fellow of the R Street Institute and former president and chief executive
officer of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago), and Professors of Law Jay
Brown, Amitai Aviram, and Robert Rhee for their positive feedback and helpful
comments.  A post discussing this article can be found on the Columbia Law
School’s Blue Sky Blog, see Bernard S. Sharfman, How Dual Class Shares in IPOs Can
Create Value, COLUM. L. SCHOOL: BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), http://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2017/08/01/how-dual-class-shares-in-ipos-can-create-value/
[https://perma.cc/X896-3DLH].  In order to maximize the value of this Article in
the real world of corporate governance, an early draft was submitted to the index
providers, S&P Dow Jones Indices, MSCI Inc., and FTSE Russell, for the purpose of
influencing their respective public consultations on the eligibility of non-voting
shares.  An early draft of this Article was also sent to the Singapore and Hong Kong
stock exchanges, respectively, to help them in their current deliberations on
whether dual class shares should be listed.
1. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the motivations of
those who lead the institutions that make up the shareholder empowerment move-
ment, suffice it to say that the movement advocates for the shifting of corporate
decision-making authority to shareholders, and thus away from the most informed
loci of corporate authority, boards of directors and executive management, with-
out regard to the impact on the decision-making of public companies.  Share-
holder empowerment, not shareholder wealth maximization, is the objective of the
movement.  Consistent with this argument, numerous research studies have con-
firmed that their activism is indifferent to shareholder wealth maximization. See
Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evi-
dence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUDIES 187, 189 (2012) (finding that “[w]hen
a firm’s unionized employees are no longer represented by the AFL-CIO, the AFL-
CIO’s pension funds become significantly less opposed to the firm’s directors in
subsequent board elections”); Jonathan B. Cohn et al., On Enhancing Shareholder
(1)
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funds with over $3 billion in assets, has renewed its efforts to eliminate,
restrict, or at least discourage the use of dual class share structures (multi-
ple classes of common stock with unequal voting rights) in initial public
offerings (IPOs).  These renewed efforts were triggered by the recent
Snap Inc. IPO that utilized non-voting stock.  Such advocacy, if successful,
would not be trivial, as many of our most valuable and dynamic compa-
nies2 have gone public by offering shares with unequal voting rights.
Besides Snap Inc., companies with dual class shares include Alphabet
Inc. (more commonly known as Google), LinkedIn (acquired by Microsoft
for $26 billion in 2016), Comcast, Zoetis, Inc., Nike, Inc., Facebook, Inc.,
and Alibaba Group.3  Three of these companies, Alphabet, Facebook, and
Alibaba, ranked in the top fifteen in the world based on the market value
of their common stock in 2017.4  Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a company that
also uses a dual class share structure, ranks in the top ten, but it only
started using the structure in 1996, long after Warren Buffet bought con-
trol of the company in 1962.5  As reported by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi
Kastiel, public companies with dual class shares had an aggregate market
Control: A (Dodd-) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access, 71 J. FIN. 1623, 1626 (2016) (sug-
gesting that unions and public pension funds participating in proxy access could
lead to decreases in shareholder value); John G. Matsusaka et al., Opportunistic Pro-
posals by Union Shareholders 15 (Marshall School of Business, University of Southern
California, Working Paper No. 17-3, July 2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2666064 [https://perma.cc/7FJB-5ZX2] (finding that shareholder proposals
were being used as “bargaining chips in contract negotiations”); Tara Bhandari et
al., Governance Changes Through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access,
FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 4 (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2635695 [https://perma.cc
/BG4Z-MDS5] (reporting that “proponents are just as likely to target firms that
were expected to benefit the least from proxy access as those that were expected to
benefit the most”); TRACIE WOIDTKE, MANHATTAN INST., PUBLIC PENSION FUND AC-
TIVISM AND FIRM VALUE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 2015), http://
www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/lpr_20.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X3Y-3MQ3]
(finding that “[o]wnership by public pension funds engaged in social-issue share-
holder-proposal activism is negatively related to firm value”).
2. For purposes of this Article, a public company can be defined as a for-profit
corporation that is publicly traded on a national exchange or over the counter.
3. See Jay Greene, Microsoft to Acquire LinkedIn for $26.2 Billion, WALL ST. J.
(June 14, 2016, 12:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-to-acquire-
linkedin-in-deal-valued-at-26-2-billion-1465821523 [https://perma.cc/5TN4-J44A];
Alibaba: A Dictatorship?, COLUMBIA BUS. SCHOOL: CHAZEN GLOBAL INSIGHTS (Nov. 7,
2016), https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/chazen-global-insights/alibaba-
dictatorship [https://perma.cc/5GEM-AE6H]; Dual Class Companies List, COUNCIL
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Mar. 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/3_17_17_List_
of_DC_for_Website(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/K4EE-AJ9Y].
4. See Global Top 100 Companies by Market Capitalisation, PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 35 (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit
-services/assets/pdf/global-top-100-companies-2017-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WNA8-8D9F].
5. See Prospectus Filed Pursuant to Rule 424(b)(4) (Form 424B4), Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc., (May 9, 1996), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
109694/ 0000898430-96-001695.txt [https://perma.cc/L4BN-MCNV]; Global Top
100 Companies by Market Capitalisation, supra note 4.
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value of over $3 trillion as of July 2016.6  However, based on current stock
prices, the aggregate market value is most likely closer to $4 trillion.
As part of the movement’s renewed advocacy against dual class shares,
the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), the trade organization that
represents the movement, has asked the S&P Dow Jones Indices, MSCI
Inc., and FTSE Russell to exclude Snap Inc. and other companies with
non-voting stock from their indexes7 unless they include extremely restric-
tive provisions such as maximum sunset provisions of three to five years.8
Moreover, consistent with the CII’s general policy, the requests to these
index providers also advocated for a forced conversion to one share, one
vote of all existing dual class share structures unless the majority of the
non-super-voting common shares vote in favor of extending the dual class
structures for a maximum of five years.9
So far, the movement’s advocacy has been a success.  The FTSE Rus-
sell has announced that it would bar companies from inclusion in its
benchmark indexes unless more than 5% of the voting rights are in the
hands of public shareholders (unrestricted (free-float) shareholders)10;
the S&P Dow Jones Indices has decided to exclude all new dual class share
offerings, including Snap Inc.’s, from the S&P Composite 1500 and its
components, the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 60011;
and while the MSCI Inc. decision is still pending, it is expected to put into
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-
Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594 (2017).
7. See, e.g., Hazel Bradford, Snap IPO Igniting Furor; Institutions Not Pleased, PEN-
SIONS & INVS. (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.pionline.com/article/20170320/
PRINT/303209977/snap-ipo-igniting-furor-institutions-not-pleased [https://per
ma.cc/M8N3-E3QE].
8. See Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional
Inv’rs, to FTSE Russell Governance Board (Mar. 24, 2017),  http://www.cii.org/
files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2017/03_24_17_letter_ftse.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/KBC4-27MD]; Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of
Institutional Inv’rs, to MSCI Equity Index Committee (Mar. 29, 2017), http://
www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2017/03_29_17_MSCI_
letter_request_for_consultation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XYE-GGJR]; Memoran-
dum from the Council of Institutional Investors, to S&P Dow Jones Indices  (Apr.
27, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2017/
20170426%20CII%20comment%20S&P%20no%20vote%20share.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6SG6-DMUK] (“In re: S&P Dow Jones Indices consultation with mem-
bers of the investment community on the eligibility of non-voting share classes in
S&P DJI indices”).
9. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Council of Institutional Investors, supra
note 8.
10. See FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION—NEXT
STEPS 3 (July 2017), http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Vot
ing_Rights_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W4F-2LBC].
11. See Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices An-
nounces Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://
www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/5611
62_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf?force_down
load=true [https://perma.cc/E6ZM-7VEQ].
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place restrictions consistent with the other two index providers.12  These
are not trivial exclusions.  For example, some $8.7 trillion in assets are
benchmarked or indexed to the S&P 500.13  If we accept the rule of
thumb that inclusion in these indexes increases a company’s stock price by
an average of 4%,14 then billions of dollars of investor value must have
been foregone because of these exclusions, negatively impacting all types
of investors, including investors who had invested in actively managed mu-
tual funds that were holding such equity securities.
The movement’s advocacy is not confined to those IPOs with dual
class shares listed on the U.S. stock exchanges.  It has also attempted to
persuade the Singapore and Hong Kong stock exchanges, respectively, not
to allow the listing of dual class share structures.15  Here, the movement’s
advocacy has not been as successful.  The Singapore Stock Exchange has
announced that it will allow companies with dual class share structures to
list their shares as long as they already have primary listings on “developed
market” exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ.16
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange has made a proposal to list dual class
shares and has taken some steps toward its implementation.17
12. See Nick Baker et al., MSCI Extends Review of Whether to Ban Multiple-Class
Stocks, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/
markets/2017/11/02/msci-extends-review-of-whether-to-ban-multiple-class-stocks
[https://perma.cc/ADH6-VQHP].
13. See, e.g., S&P Dow Jones Indices Releases Annual Survey of Assets, PR NEWSWIRE
(June 29, 2017, 06:20 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sp-dow-
jones-indices-releases-annual-survey-of-assets-300481674.html [https://perma.cc/
RC9X-5VWA] (results based on a survey using data as of Dec. 31, 2016).
14. See, e.g., Maria Kasch & Asani Sarkar, Is There an S&P 500 Index Effect? 42
tbl.1  (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 484, 2014), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171235 [https://perma.cc/V3ET-
7K2T]; see also Adam Levy, Why Excluding Snap from the S&P 500 Is a Big Deal, MOT-
LEY FOOL (Mar. 9, 2017, 08:00 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/03/
09/why-excluding-snap-from-the-sp-500-is-a-big-deal.aspx [https://perma.cc/
B73L-YK4H] (“When Alphabet [(Google)] was added to the S&P 500, it received
an immediate 7% bump in its share price.  Facebook received a 4% boost [when it
was added] . . . .”).
15. See Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional
Inv’rs, to CEO Loh Boon Chye & Chief Regulatory Officer Tan Boon Gin, Singa-
pore Exch. Ltd. (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/
correspondence/2017/03_29_17_letter_to_SGX.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVW3-
WY94] (advocating for keeping dual class shares off the exchange); Letter from
Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to Hong Kong
Exchs. & Clearing Ltd. (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advo
cacy/correspondence/8-4-17%20CII%20response%20to%20HK%20Concept%20
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTU9-K346] (advocating for keeping companies
with non-conforming governance arrangements off the exchange).
16. See Press Release, SGX, SGX Clarifies That Existing Secondary Listing
Framework Allows Dual Class Share Companies (July 28, 2017), http://www.
sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/higlights/news_releases/sgx_clarifies
_that_existing_secondary_listing_framework_allows_dual_class_share_companies
[https://perma.cc/9ZJ9-U62T].
17. See STOCK EXCH. OF H.K. LTD., CONCEPT PAPER: NEW BOARD 14 (June
2017), https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/Documents/cp20
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In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Invest-
ment Advisory Committee, whose chair and co-chair at the time just hap-
pened to represent institutions who are the leaders in the shareholder
empowerment movement—the Chartered Financial Analysts (CFA) Insti-
tute18 and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, respec-
tively—quickly put the Snap Inc. IPO, and dual class share structures in
general, on the agenda for its March 9, 2017 meeting.19  Finally, it is also
expected that the CII will again try and persuade the stock exchanges to
prohibit the listing of companies with dual class share structures.20
The movement’s vigorous response to Snap Inc.’s hugely successful
IPO was unsurprising.  The CII, since its founding in 1985, has promoted
as one of its bedrock principles a “one share, one vote” policy.21  This
policy may be referred to as “shareholder democracy” and should not be
confused with political democracy where each person gets one vote.22  In
shareholder democracy, voting power is assigned according to property
ownership, i.e., how many shares the person or entity owns.23
Dual class share structures clearly violate the CII’s policy of share-
holder democracy and are an obvious threat to the power of the move-
ment.  That is, if more public companies utilize a dual class share
structure, more controlled companies exist and the movement has less
17061.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9LP-BSFR] (setting forth proposal to allow dual
class shares); Jennifer Hughes, Hong Kong to Push Ahead with Controversial Dual-Class
Shares, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017, 04:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
hkex-regulation/hong-kong-to-push-ahead-with-controversial-dual-class-shares-id
USKBN1E90UR [https://perma.cc/55CS-CTSL].
18. See Mary Leung, Snapchat IPO: What’s Wrong with This Picture?, CFA INST.:
MARKET INTEGRITY INSIGHTS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2017), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/
marketintegrity/2017/04/18/snapchat-ipo-whats-wrong-with-this-picture/ [https:/
/perma.cc/6NNB-6SCZ] (expounding on the CFA Institute’s one-share, one-vote
policy and supporting the efforts of CalPERS, a leader in the shareholder empow-
erment movement, on this issue).
19. See Bradford, supra note 7.
20. See, e.g., James Moloney et al., Non-Voting Shares Make Their Public Debut and
Generate Some Governance Concerns, but How Will Courts View the Structure When First
Presented?, GIBSON DUNN: SECS. REG. & CORP. GOVERNANCE MONITOR (Mar. 12,
2017), http://www.securitiesregulationmonitor.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=28
8 [https://perma.cc/SFS6-FQZ9].
21. See, e.g., Anne Sherry, Snap IPO Has Investor Advisory Committee Debating No-
Vote Offerings, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SECS. REG. (Mar. 13, 2017), http://
jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/snap-ipo-has-investor-advisory.html
[https://perma.cc/CFP5-DGTQ].
22. Daniel Fischel uses the term “corporate democracy” instead of share-
holder democracy.  However, the terms are meant to be interchangeable. See
Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 141 (1987).
23. See id.
5
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power.  In 2012,24 2014,25 and 2017,26 the CII has tried to use its eco-
nomic and political influence to get rid of dual class share structures.
Most importantly, the movement’s advocacy comes into strong con-
flict with what many believe to be the great strength of our system of cor-
porate governance—the private ordering of governance arrangements,
with dual class share structures being an optimal result of that ordering:
One of America’s greatest strengths is that we are a magnet for
entrepreneurship and innovation.  Central to cultivating this
strength is establishing multiple paths entrepreneurs can take to
public markets.  Each publicly-traded company should have flexi-
bility to determine a class structure that is most appropriate and
beneficial for them, so long as this structure is transparent and
disclosed up-front so that investors have complete visibility into
the company.  Dual class structures allow investors to invest side-
by-side with innovators and high-growth companies, enjoying the
financial benefits of these companies’ success.27
24. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional
Inv’rs, to Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Chief Regula-
tory Officer, NASDAQ OMX Group (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.cii.org/files/is
sues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/10_02_12_cii_letter_to_nasdaq_dual_
class_stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4B6-P4HV] (“The Council of Institutional In-
vestors . . . hereby asks you to propose a rule for approval by the United States . . .
Securities and Exchange Commission under which (1) companies that seek an
initial listing on the NASDAQ Stock Market or the BX Venture Market . . . will be
ineligible for a listing if they have two or more classes of common stock with une-
qual voting rights, and (2) companies newly listed on NASDAQ in the future will
be prohibited from issuing multi-class stock with unequal voting rights subsequent
to their initial listing.  Of note, the Council is not, at this time, requesting a pro-
posed rule change that would impact currently listed companies with multi-class
stock structures.”); see also Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of
Institutional Inv’rs, to Claudia Crowley, CEO & Chief Regulatory Officer, NYSE
Regulation (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/corre
spondence/2012/10_2_12_cii_letter_to_nyse_dual_class_stock.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7SBM-5EJ4].
25. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional
Inv’rs, to Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Chief Regula-
tory Officer, NASDAQ OMX Group (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/is
sues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_letter_to_nasdaq_one
_share_one_vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2P4-WVSY] (trying to discourage the
NASDAQ from listing Alibaba’s dual class shares); see also Letter from Jeff Maho-
ney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to John Carey, Vice President—
Legal, NYSE Regulation, Inc., NYSE Euronext (Mar. 27, 2014), http://
www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2014/03_27_14_CII_let
ter_to_NYSE_one_share_one_vote.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z7M-R255].
26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for letters sent by the Council of
Institutional Investors protesting the listing of dual class stock.
27. NASDAQ, THE PROMISE OF MARKET REFORM: REIGNITING AMERICA’S ECO-
NOMIC ENGINE 16 (2017), http://business.nasdaq.com/media/Nasdaq%20Blue
print%20to%20Revitalize%20Capital%20Markets_tcm5044-43175.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L9HU-R52D].
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This Article concurs with the above statement provided by NASDAQ,
Inc.  By utilizing Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire’s newly proposed
“principal-cost theory”—“each firm’s optimal governance structure mini-
mizes the sum of principal costs, produced when investors exercise con-
trol, and agent costs, produced when managers exercise control,”28—this
Article argues that the use of the dual class share structure in IPOs is a
value-enhancing result of the bargaining that takes place in the private
ordering of corporate governance arrangements, making the movement’s
renewed advocacy unwarranted.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the characteristics of
dual class share structures and provides a short regulatory history.  Part III
utilizes Goshen and Squire’s principal-cost theory within a private order-
ing framework to explain how the dual class share structure and its re-
quirement for common stock with unequal voting rights can result in an
optimal corporate governance arrangement.  Part IV concludes.
II. DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
AND HISTORY
Dual class share structures allow for a “wedge” to be created between
a company’s cash flows and voting rights such that voting control, and
thereby control of the company and its board, can be maintained by insid-
ers—such as the founders—without having to own a majority of the com-
pany’s common stock outstanding.29  That is, by holding onto the bulk of
their super-voting shares, insiders have the option of selling off or donat-
ing a large bulk of their non-super-voting shares without losing voting con-
trol of the company.30
Typically, a company that utilizes a dual class share structure in an
IPO will issue a class of common stock to the public that carry one vote per
share (ordinary shares), while reserving a separate class, a super-voting
class, that provide insiders with at least ten votes per share.  (Snap’s IPO
was an exception to the rule as it utilized three classes of stock, reserving
super-voting shares for the founders and ordinary shares for early inves-
tors, and only offering non-voting stock to the public.31)  However, both
types of shares will typically have equal rights to the cash flows of the com-
pany.  Sometimes, such as with Nike, Inc., the super-voting class will elect
28. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corpo-
rate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 767 (2017) (emphasis omitted).
29. See Gabriela M. Engler Pinto, Why They Persist? An Analysis of Dual Class
Structures and the Unification Process in the U.S. and Brazil, 10 REVISTA DIREITO GV 23,
25 (2014); see also Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-
Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084 (2010).  On average,
the authors found that insiders of dual class firms held 60% of the voting power,
with the vast majority of this power coming from super-voting shares, “and 40% of
the cash flow rights.” Id.
30. See Gompers et al., supra note 29, at 1053.
31. See infra Part III.B.
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the majority of directors and the class sold to the public will elect the mi-
nority of directors.32  Depending on the “sunset provisions” (triggers that
terminate the super-voting characteristics of these shares, such as upon the
death of the founder or when the founder stops taking an active role in
the company) found in the super-voting shares, or lack thereof, this con-
trol can potentially last for the lives of the founders and then be passed on
to their descendants.
In the United States, dual class shares have been around since at least
1898 and have been tolerated to a greater or lesser extent by the major
exchanges since at least the 1920s.33  For example, in 1926, the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) implemented an unannounced ban on non-vot-
ing stock34 and then formally announced a one share, one vote listing
standard in 194035—a policy that lasted until 1984.36  The unannounced
ban was a result of the activism of a leading corporate governance scholar
of his time, William Ripley—a Harvard professor of political economy.
Ripley was an early champion of the idea of one share, one vote who
found support from both the press and then-President Calvin Coolidge37
in his condemnation of the issuance of non-voting shares by high-profile
companies such as Dodge Brothers, Industrial Rayon Corporation, A&W
Root Beer, and Fox Theaters.38
Over time, there were exceptions to the NYSE’s one share, one vote
listing standard, such as when Ford Motor Co. listed dual class shares on
the NYSE.39  While the shares sold by the Ford Foundation did have voting
rights, shares which were converted from non-voting to voting to qualify
for NYSE listing, these rights were inferior to those found in the super-
voting shares retained by the Ford family.40  Incidentally, the sale to the
32. See Nike, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6 (July 25, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320187/000032018716000339/nke-20
16xdef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/XCN6-G9YS].
33. See, e.g., Pinto, supra note 29, at 28.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See, e.g., Kaitlin Descovich et al., Voting Rights Gone in a Snap—Unequal Vot-
ing Rights Back in the Spotlight, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES: GOVERNANCE & SEC.
ALERT (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.weil.com/~/media/publications/alerts/2017/
pcag-alert.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX28-ERZ2].
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See, e.g., Peter N. Flocos, Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the “One Share
One Vote” Controversy: An Epitaph for the SEC’s Rule 19c-4?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1761,
1762 (1990).
38. See Stephen I. Glover & Aarthy S. Thamodaran, Debating the Pros and Cons
of Dual Class Capital Structures, 27 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 1, 2 (2013).
39. See, e.g., William Bratton, Let Dual-Class Companies List Abroad, in Dual-Class
Stock: Governance at the Edge, SHAREHOLDER VALUE, 3d Q., 2012, at 37, 43, http://
sites.udel.edu/wccg/files/2012/10/Dual-Shares-Q3-20121.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B2UL-JT6W].
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting Limiting Voting Common
Shares—Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 37, 63 (1987).
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public of the Ford ordinary shares was an unqualified success, requiring
significant rationing of these shares to clients of retail brokerage houses.41
In 1988, the SEC issued the short-lived Rule 19c-4.42  The rule barred
U.S. stock exchanges (self-regulatory organizations) from listing the stock
of any issuer that took any action “with the effect of nullifying, restricting
or disparately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing common
stockholders].”43  As other observers have recognized,  “shortly after the
rule was implemented, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit unanimously ruled that the SEC had exceeded its au-
thority in issuing the rule.”44  Specifically, the court of appeals found that:
[T]he [Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934] cannot be under-
stood to include regulation of an issue that is so far beyond mat-
ters of disclosure (such as those disclosures required under § 14 of
the Exchange Act), and of the management and practices of self-
regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of corpo-
rate governance traditionally left to the states.45
Moreover, “[w]ith its step beyond control of voting procedure and
into the distribution of voting power, the Commission would assume an
authority that the Exchange Act’s proponents disclaimed any intent to
grant.”46  However, it is within the authority of the SEC to require stock
exchanges to seek its approval prior to implementing new stock exchange
rules as long as the criteria used in the approval process is consistent with
the “furtherance of the purposes” of the Exchange Act.47
Interestingly, unlike the NYSE, the NASDAQ and the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX) have always allowed for dual class shares, even though
the AMEX did implement a ban on non-voting stock in 1972.48  “In 1994,
[with the approval of the SEC,] all three exchanges adopted a uniform
policy, allowing companies with dual class structures to be listed.”49  How-
41. See, e.g., Jim Henry, Henry Ford Never Wanted His Company to Go Public, AU-
TOMOTIVE NEWS (June 16, 2003, 12:01 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/
20030616/SUB/306160730/henry-ford-never-wanted-his-company-to-go-public
[https://perma.cc/KVV9-8C38].
42. See Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.19c-4 (1990) (vacated by Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d
406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
43. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 407 (quoting Rule 19c-4).
44. See Pinto, supra note 29, at 29.
45. Id. at 408 (emphasis added).  The court stated, “Because the rule directly
controls the substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders, we
find it in excess of the Commission’s authority under § 19 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.” Id. at 407.
46. Id. at 411.
47. See id. at 409.
48. See Pinto, supra note 29, at 28.
49. Id. at 29.  See generally Rule 313.00(A) & (B): Voting Rights, NYSE LISTING
COMPANY MANUAL, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp
?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_4_13_1&CiRestriction=voting+ANDRights&
9
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ever, consistent with vacated Rule 19c-4, the policy, except for a small ex-
ception implemented by the AMEX,50 an institution which has since been
absorbed by the NYSE, “barred companies from reducing their existing
shareholders’ voting rights.”51
It may be somewhat surprising that on an annual basis only a rela-
tively small number of companies go public with a dual class share struc-
ture.  In the U.S., only a handful of IPOs have utilized dual class shares: 17
of 111 in 2016,52 27 of 174 in 2015,53 and 36 of 292 in 2014.54  In 2015,
over half of the IPOs using dual class structures were in the technology
sector.55  Also, the current trend is for dual class share structures to be
associated with IPOs with the largest market values, such as the recent
Snap Inc. IPO, which valued the company at approximately $28.3
billion.56
In Europe, the listing of dual class shares is quite prevalent.57  Stock
exchanges in Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland permit the listing of dual class shares.58  How-
ever, the Hong Kong, London, and Singapore stock exchanges still do not
allow for dual class shares even though Singapore is currently in the pro-
cess of determining whether such shares should be listed.
In sum, the dual class share structure continues to endure globally.
Nevertheless, even after 100 years of use, it has yet to gain universal accept-
ance, especially by activists who see common stock ownership as a means
to implement shareholder democracy, not shareholder wealth
maximization.
manual=%2FLCM%2FSections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/5QWN-
CNV3]; Rule 5640: Voting Rights, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LISTING RULES, http://
nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp
_1_1_4_3_8_31&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F
[https://perma.cc/6W9D-GFAW].
50. See Pinto, supra note 29, at 29.
51. Id.
52. Caitlin Huston, Snap Backlash, Facebook Capitulation Won’t Stop Founder-
Friendly Stock Structures, MARKET WATCH (Sept. 27, 2017, 07:24 AM), http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/snap-backlash-facebook-capitulation-wont-stop-multi-
class-stock-structures-2017-09-22 [https://perma.cc/7JV5-7AJ4].
53. Ross Kerber, U.S. Investor Group Urges Halt to Dual-Class Structures in IPOs,
REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2016, 09:37 AM), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ipo-voting
rights-idUSKCN0WP1Q0 [https://perma.cc/K344-Z7NZ].
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Matthews, Valuation of Shares of Companies with a Dual
Class Structure, AM. SOC’Y OF APPRAISERS: ADVANCED BUS. VALUATION CONFERENCE
(Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.appraisers.org/docs/default-source/event_doc/
2016_bv_presentation_matthews.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/C9L7-Z4RP].
56. See Lauren Hirsch, Snap’s Shares Pop After Year’s Biggest IPO, REUTERS (Mar.
2, 2017, 01:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-ipo-idUSKBN1690I7
[https://perma.cc/K6KF-KW2B].
57. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6, at 595, 599.
58. See id. at 599.
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III. DUAL CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES AS THE VALUE MAXIMIZING RESULT
OF PRIVATE ORDERING
An IPO allows a company to achieve the objectives of accessing a huge
new investor base, investors who participate in the public equity markets,
and providing enhanced liquidity for the company’s shares.  Having a
company’s stock publicly traded also provides important signals, through
changes and trends in the price of the stock, to the board and executive
management on how well the company is doing and its prospects.  In addi-
tion, an IPO that utilizes a dual class share structure allows for the continu-
ation of the governance arrangements that existed prior to the IPO.
These governance arrangements and how it impacts the rights of those
who invest in the ordinary shares of a company are described quite nicely
by Larry Page in Google’s 2004 registration statement:
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a corporate
structure that will make it harder for outside parties to take over or
influence Google.  This structure will also make it easier for our
management team to follow the long term, innovative approach
emphasized earlier.
. . .
The main effect of this structure is likely to leave our team, espe-
cially Sergey [Brin] and me, with significant control over the company’s
decisions and fate, as Google shares change hands. New investors
will fully share in Google’s long term growth but will have less influence
over its strategic decisions than they would at most public companies.
While this structure is unusual for technology companies, it
is common in the media business and has had a profound impor-
tance there. . . .  Media observers frequently point out that dual
class ownership has allowed these companies to concentrate on
their core, long-term interest in serious news coverage, despite fluctu-
ations in quarterly results.  The Berkshire Hathaway company has
applied the same structure, with similar beneficial effects.  From
the point of view of long-term success in advancing a company’s
core values, the structure has clearly been an advantage.
Academic studies have shown that from a purely economic point of
view, dual class structures have not harmed the share price of companies.
The shares of each of our classes have identical economic rights
and differ only as to voting rights.59
This statement makes several key points regarding the use of dual
class shares.  First, Alphabet will be almost invulnerable to takeovers and
the potential efficiency benefits that such takeovers may provide unless the
59. Google, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at iii (Apr. 29, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/
ds1.htm [https://perma.cc/6UF8-EB9B].
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holders of the super-voting stock approve a takeover.60  According to
Henry Manne, “the control of corporations may constitute a valuable as-
set” in and of itself, an asset that “exists independent of any interest in
either economics of scale or monopoly profits,” if the acquirer takes con-
trol with the expectation of correcting managerial inefficiencies.61  Ac-
cording to Daniel Fischel, “[t]he cost of dual class common stock is that
the effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a monitoring de-
vice is reduced.”62
Second, Alphabet will be invulnerable to the actions of activist hedge
funds, such as a threatened or actual proxy contest to replace board mem-
bers, to persuade the board to either make significant strategic changes or
prepare to sell out.63  Again, without these activities, efficiencies may be
lost.  Using Henry Manne’s writings on the market for corporate control as
a foundation, I have argued that hedge fund activism may also constitute
“a valuable asset in and of itself if the purpose of such activism is to correct
[such] managerial inefficiencies.”64  Moreover, while hedge fund activism
does not necessarily get it right in each individual instance,65 on average,
the ability of activist hedge funds to significantly increase the value of a
targeted company’s stock has been repeatedly tested and affirmed,66 al-
60. See Gompers et al., supra note 29, at 1052.  Based on the sample used in
the study conducted by Gompers et al., the average age of companies with dual
class share structures in 2001 was 12.87 years while the average age for single-class
companies was 9.60 years. See id. at 1059.  In the opinion of the authors of that
study, the most likely explanation for this difference was a resistance to being ac-
quired on the part of the dual class companies. See id.
61. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965).
62. Fischel, supra note 22, at 140.
63. However, as the Forest City Realty Trust, Inc.’s mid-stream conversion
from a dual class share structure to all ordinary shares demonstrates, activist hedge
funds may still have influence if the controlling shareholders and the board are
willing to listen. See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text explaining that the
founding family still has some degree of control over the real estate trust.
64. See Bernard S. Sharfman, A Theory of Shareholder Activism and Its Place in
Corporate Law, 82 TENN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2015).
65. See, e.g., Goshen & Squire, supra note 28, at 821 (“Yet activist funds can
also generate principal costs [costs of shareholders making decisions], a downside
that their academic supporters dismiss.  Because information asymmetries can pre-
vent shareholders from differentiating good activist campaigns from bad ones, a
fund might force managers to slash capital expenditures that are actually efficient.
Ultimately, the impact of activism on control costs—the reduction in agent costs,
net of the increase in principal costs—will be specific to the target firm.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
66. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activ-
ism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731 (2008); Nicole M.
Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14
REV. DERIVATIVES RES. 169, 175–78, 201 (2011); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Crea-
tion or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323, 324
(2008); Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J.
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss1/1
2018] A COMPANY’S RIGHT TO USE DUAL CLASS IPOS 13
lowing Paul Rose and I to argue that hedge fund activism acts as a “correc-
tive mechanism” in the governance of a public company.67
Third, after going through several rounds of private financing—
where the universe of shareholders was confined to sophisticated investors
trying to maximize the value of their investment—the post-IPO company
must now face a much more diverse group of institutional shareholders.
This includes many more that may be both uninformed and not always
acting with the objective of maximizing shareholder wealth, such as those
institutions that make up the shareholder empowerment movement.
Somewhat surprisingly, uninformed investors also include mega-mu-
tual fund advisors, such as Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street Global Advi-
sors, and Fidelity, etc., who manage the bulk of the increasingly popular
passive index funds—that track a market weighted-index such as the S&P
500.  They are uninformed because the industry practice is to delegate
voting rights, not just portfolio management, to mutual fund advisors.  In
turn, these advisors must find a cost-effective way of dealing with this over-
whelming responsibility.  The current solution is to delegate corporate
governance advocacy and policy, and the voting on hundreds of thousands
of director elections and board and shareholder proposals, to small inter-
nal corporate governance/voting departments of the advisor.68  For exam-
ple, Vanguard’s Investor Stewardship team voted by proxy at over 16,000
annual meetings covering nearly 160,000 votes for the twelve months end-
ing June 30, 2016.69  As of January 2017, Vanguard’s governance team
only employed twenty people.70  Therefore, these small departments of
corporate governance professionals cannot possibly meet the definition of
informed investors as they must deal with an overwhelming number of
companies and votes.  The result may be cost-effective for the mutual fund
advisors, but it only allows for a “one-size-fits-all” approach71 with some
limited number of exceptions.
FIN. ECON. 362, 374 (2009); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 213, 217–18 (2009).
67. Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism As a Corrective Mech-
anism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1015 (2014).
68. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Index Funds Are
Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017, 06:30
PM), https://www.wsj.com/article_email/index-funds-are-great-for-investors-risky-
for-corporate-governance-1498170623-lMyQjAxMTA3MTI3MjYyNjI1Wj/ [https://
perma.cc/AS7L-NNNE].
69. See Our Engagement Efforts and Proxy Voting: An Update, VANGUARD, https://
about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/update-on-voting/index.html
[https://perma.cc/39EE-5S4B] (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
70. See, e.g., Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Bulk Up
Governance Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b
243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a?mhq5j=E3 [https://perma.cc/8JX7-7F42].  It
was also reported that Blackrock had thirty-one, Fidelity had twelve, and State
Street Global Advisors had eleven. See id.
71. See Henderson & Lund, supra note 68.
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Moreover, this delegation of voting rights may be leading to an in-
creasing amount of opportunistic behavior on the part of mega-mutual
fund advisors.  It has been “argued that mega-mutual fund advisors have
been drawn into an alliance with the shareholder empowerment move-
ment on the issues of proxy access and dual class share structures . . .
simply because of the business opportunity such an alliance represents.”72
That opportunity is to attract or retain the business of public pension
funds and union related funds, the institutional leaders in the shareholder
empowerment movement, which are shifting their portfolios away from
high-cost, actively managed mutual funds and hedge funds to low-cost in-
dexed funds, the kind of funds that the top ten largest mutual fund advi-
sors dominate in terms of market share.73  By utilizing a dual class share
structure, the board of Alphabet will not have to be responsive to these
uninformed and potentially opportunistic shareholders.
Fourth, the founders will have the luxury of implementing their stra-
tegic vision without feeling the pressure to make changes just because
their quarterly results have disappointed shareholders.  For example,
Mark Zuckerberg faced a lot of criticism back in April 2012 for his deci-
sion to have Facebook purchase “an app that had 13 employees and zero
revenue.”74  This acquisition occurred just one month before the com-
pany launched its IPO with a dual class share structure.  As reported, the
then twenty-seven-year-old CEO of Facebook completed the acquisition
prior to even consulting the board that he was negotiating the purchase.75
To add fuel to the fire, the price of Facebook stock fell like a rock shortly
after its IPO, down 54% after four months of public trading.76  As late as
July 2015, analysts were still wondering if the acquisition would earn
72. Bernard S. Sharfman, Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Gov-
ernance Issues, COLUM. L. SCHOOL: BLUE SKY BLOG (July 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.
law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisors-empty-voting-raises-new-gov
ernance-issues/ [https://perma.cc/SA4M-G9G6].
73. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 18 (2017),
http://www.icifactbook.org/deployedfiles/FactBook/Site%20Properties/pdf/20
17/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN7P-9Z5M] (“[T]he growing popular-
ity of index funds increased concentration because the 10 largest fund complexes
manage most of the assets in index mutual funds.”).
74. See, e.g., Alexei Oreskovic, Everyone Thought Mark Zuckerberg Was Crazy to
Buy a 13-Person App for $1 billion—Now Instagram Looks Like One of the Most Brilliant
Tech Acquisitions Ever Made, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2016, 08:54 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/instagram-zuckerbergs-biggest-win-so-far-2016-1 [https:/
/perma.cc/C6PU-8X6E].
75. See, e.g., Joe Coscarelli, Mark Zuckerberg Bought Instagram Without Really Ask-
ing the Facebook Board, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 18, 2012, 08:55 AM), http://nymag.com/
daily/intelligencer/2012/04/mark-zuckerberg-bought-instagram-without-asking-
facebook-board.html [https://perma.cc/LT3C-P9TE].
76. See, e.g., Matthew Galgani, A Tale of 4 IPOs: Facebook, Alibaba, Snap and
Square, INV’S. BUS. DAILY (Oct. 21, 2017), http://www.investors.com/how-to-invest/
investors-corner/a-tale-of-4-ipos-facebook-alibaba-snap-and-square/ [https://per
ma.cc/JT46-CSFQ].
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money for Facebook.77  That acquisition was Instagram, the Facebook sub-
sidiary that may currently be worth up to $25 billion to $35 billion if not
higher78 and which is expected to generate revenues of $3.92 billion in
2017.79  Without a dual class share structure providing Zuckerberg with
control of Facebook, the young CEO may have felt quarterly pressure to
prove that he had made the right decision, perhaps undermining his cred-
ibility in the eyes of an independent board as well as his managerial au-
thority, and thereby undermining his credibility as not only the right
person to be the company’s CEO but also the one whose vision the board
still needs to implement.
Fifth, empirical research is still ambiguous regarding the value of dual
class share structures.80  This should not be surprising.  As noted by Rene´e
Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “Because ownership structures are endoge-
nous,” i.e., companies do not choose to use this structure based on some
77. See, e.g., Erin Griffith, Wall Street Wants to Know If Instagram Can Make
Money, FORTUNE (July 29, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/29/wall-street-
wants-to-know-if-instagram-can-make-money/ [https://perma.cc/RYM7-PLJ5].
78. See, e.g., Yoni Heisler, Once Mocked, Facebook’s $1 Billion Acquisition of In-
stagram Was a Stroke of Genius, YAHOO! TECH. (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.ya-
hoo.com/tech/once-mocked-facebook-1-billion-acquisition-instagram-stroke-0426
04919.html [https://perma.cc/3XHL-R8MV].
79. See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, Facebook Reports Strong First Quarter; Revenue,
Earnings Beat Estimates, FORBES (May 3, 2017, 04:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/05/03/facebook-shares-rise-on-first-quarter-reve
nue-that-beat-estimates/#380a62106b6d [https://perma.cc/56SE-89LX].
80. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 28, at 815–16 (“While some studies have
linked the dual-class share structure to lower firm value, others have found no
correlation once firm-specific attributes are taken into account . . . .”).  Perhaps
most telling, even a recent CII report could not make the case that dual class
shares were wealth reducing. See GABRIEL MOREY, COUNCIL OF INST. INV’RS., MULTI-
CLASS STOCK AND FIRM VALUE: DOES MULTI-CLASS STOCK ENHANCE FIRM PERFORM-
ANCE?  A REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 (May 2017), http://www.cii.org/files/publica
tions/misc/05_10_17_dual-class_value_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VY8-FDTT]
(“[A] multi-class common equity structure with unequal voting rights neither in-
creases nor decreases a company’s annualized return on invested capital
(ROIC).”); see also Ronald Anderson et al., The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair
29 (Fox Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No. 17-021, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006669 [https://perma.cc/WBT3-KYQ3] (“Using
industry adjusted, market adjusted, and Fama-French size and book-to market ad-
justed returns, we find that a buy-and-hold strategy of dual class family firms earns
excess returns of about 350 basis points per year relative to our benchmark (single
class nonfamily firms).”).  Moreover, “[a]fter controlling for time, industry, and a
wide variety of firm-specific factors, our analysis does not lend support to the no-
tion that dual class structures harm outside investors.  Rather, our results suggest
that the dual class structure—in-and-of itself—has no effect on outside investors.”
Id. at 5; see also Ekkehart Bo¨hmer et al., The Effect of Consolidated Control on Firm
Performance: The Case of Dual-Class IPOs, in EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN RAISING EQUITY CAPI-
TAL 95, 96 (Mario Levis ed., 1996) (finding that “between 1984 and 1988” “dual-
class firms substantially outperform[ed] a matched sample of similar risk, single-
class firms during the three years following the IPO, both in terms of stock returns
and operating performance”). But see Gompers et al., supra note 29, at 1051 (find-
ing that “firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in
insider voting rights”).
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random process, “many difficulties arise in estimating the impact of dis-
proportional ownership on firm and market outcomes.”81  That is,
whatever results may be derived from a study, there is the potential that
they will be significantly biased.  Moreover, once a company enters the
public market with a dual class share structure, trying to figure out how it
would perform without such an equity structure becomes a counterfactual.
That is, we will never know if Alphabet, Alibaba, Comcast Corporation,
Facebook, etc. would have fared better or worse without super-voting
stock.  However, we do know that they and other firms have been wildly
successful with such a structure.  As stated by Fischel in the context of
firms with dual class shares:
It is even possible that the market value of the shares of such
firms would be higher if the family or founding entrepreneur
would relinquish control.  In this event, the family or entrepre-
neur is paying for its preference for control in the form of a
higher cost of capital.  Of course, the opposite can also be true.
The market value of shares in a firm controlled by a family or
founding entrepreneur may be higher if, for example, continuity
of management is valued by investors and there exist alternative
governance mechanisms to align the interests of managers and
investors.82
Also, the most significant data on IPOs with dual class shares is rela-
tively new and could use seasoning before being analyzed.  The 2004
Google IPO started the trend of large market value IPOs favoring the dual
class share structure, and this trend has picked up in the last several
years.83  This critical data has yet to be incorporated into the analysis of
dual class share structures.84  The existence of large market value compa-
nies with dual class shares also suggests that analysis of the data would
benefit from some sort of market value weighting.
Finally, when the shareholder empowerment movement tries to sup-
port its advocacy with empirical analysis, one should not accept the re-
search used without a thorough review of the data, methodology, and
results.  For example, when the CII utilized an Investor Responsibility Re-
81. See Rene´e Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: Empirical Evidence
3 (European Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance No.
177, 2007) (emphasis omitted), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=987488 [https://perma.cc/SH5T-R52L].
82. Fischel, supra note 22, at 136.
83. See, e.g., Aswath Damodaran, Weekly Puzzle #2: Dual Class Shares, Boon or
Bane?, N.Y.U. SCH. OF BUS.: DAMODARAN ONLINE, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/
adamodar/New_Home_Page/cfpuzzles/cfspr17puzzle2.htm [https://perma.cc/
8LF3-9KBS].
84. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 8.  This recent study used Rus-
sell 3000 firms data from December 31, 2001 through 2015.  However, firms such
as Google, Facebook, and Alibaba were not included in the dataset because they
issued their dual class shares after December 31, 2001.
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search Center Institute report on controlled companies85 in its advocacy
to ban dual class share structures in IPOs,86  Yvan Allaire described it as
“sloppy in design, amateurish and misleading in its statistics, and biased in
its interpretation.  Had that report been submitted as a term paper by first-
year MBA students, it would have received a fail grade.”87
A. Troubling Aspects of the Dual Class Share Structure
An IPO that incorporates a dual class share structure has other troub-
ling aspects besides being immune from the corrective mechanisms found
in the market for corporate control and hedge fund activism.  As previ-
ously noted, such IPOs can create a widening gap between voting and cash
flow rights.  This gap is called the “wedge” and can become quite extreme.
For example, in 1978, almost forty years ago, the Roberts family held 42%
of all equity shares of Comcast Corporation, but only 0.4% in 2015.88  Yet,
through a family trust holding super-voting shares, Mr. Brian Roberts, the
current Comcast Chairman and CEO and son of co-founder Ralph Rob-
erts, effectively controls the company with 33.33% voting power.89  As of
March 16, 2017, Comcast had outstanding 4,732,039,722 shares of Class A
common stock and 9,444,375 shares of Class B common stock.90  Each
holder of Class A common stock is entitled to 0.0599 votes per share, and
each holder of Class B common stock is entitled to 15 votes per share.91
Notably, Mr. Roberts, who has been at the helm of Comcast since 1990, is
a widely respected CEO, having led the company to a market valuation of
approximately $180 billion as of May 17, 2017.
85. See generally INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RES. CTR. INST., CONTROLLED COMPANIES
IN THE STANDARD & POOR’S 1500: A TEN YEAR PERFORMANCE AND RISK REVIEW (Oct.
2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-Company-ISS-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QNC5-MS2Q].  Interestingly, while the Investor Responsibility
Research Center Institute commissioned and funded this report, the research for
the paper was conducted by the proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices (ISS) and authored by Sean Quinn, a vice president with ISS. See Press Re-
lease, Inv’r Responsibility Res. Ctr. Inst., New Study Says Multiclass Voting
Companies Underperform, Riskier (Oct. 2, 2012), https://irrcinstitute.org/news/
new-study-says-multiclass-voting-companies-underperform-riskier/ [https://perma
.cc/FR6K-CEL6].
86. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Edward S. Knight, supra note 24 (letter to
NASDAQ); Letter from Jeff Mahoney to John Carey, supra note 25 (letter to
NYSE).
87. See YVAN ALLAIRE & FRANC¸OIS DAUPHIN, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE
& PUB. ORGS., TWO FLAWED STUDIES ABOUT CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS BY ISS AND
IRRCI 2 (2016) (emphasis omitted), https://igopp.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/IGOPP_Article_2flawedStudiesControlledCorpoISSandIRRC_EN_vf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7GXA-Y3CZ].
88. See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6, at 608.
89. See COMCAST CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 6 (2017), https://materials.proxy
vote.com/Approved/20030N/20170316/NPS_322517/images/Comcast-Proxy20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFZ7-YXZG].
90. See id. at 5.
91. See id.
17
Sharfman: A Private Ordering Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual Class
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
18 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 1
Bebchuk and Kastiel find this aspect of dual class share structures to
be extremely troubling, arguing that even if the structure is efficient at the
time of the IPO, “the potential advantages of dual-class structures (such as
those resulting from founders’ superior leadership skills) tend to recede,
and the potential costs tend to rise, as time passes from the IPO.”92  More-
over, “controllers have perverse incentives to retain dual-class structures
even when those structures become inefficient over time.”93  That is, “con-
trollers with low equity holdings bear only a small fraction of the negative
effects of their actions on the company value while capturing the full pri-
vate benefits.”94  Private benefits of control are a sub-category of agency
costs (“the economic losses resulting from managers’ natural incentive to
advance their personal interests even when those interests conflict with the
goal of maximizing their firm’s value”95) that may “include entering into
conflicts-of-interest transactions, misusing corporate resources for per-
sonal ends, expropriating corporate opportunities, pursuing pet projects,
and building a conglomerate empire.”96  As a result, “controllers’ incen-
tives regarding certain issues may become distorted and misaligned with
the preferences of public investors.”97  Presumably, their argument would
eventually hold even at a consistently high functioning company such as
Comcast.
To remedy the problem of the growing wedge and the potential eb-
bing of superior leadership skills over time, Bebchuck and Kastiel recom-
mend that a perpetual dual class share structure not be allowed and sunset
provisions be required that expire “after a fixed period of time (such as
92. See Bebchuk and Kastiel, supra note 6, at 585.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 602.  However, recent empirical evidence suggests the issue of the
wedge may be a non-issue. See Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 5.  In finding that
dual class shares lead to higher, not lower rates of returns for investors, the authors
also found that “single and dual class family firms with similar levels of control
exhibit similar excess returns, suggesting the premium centers on family control
rather than dual class shares.” Id.
95. Goshen & Squire, supra note 28, at 775; see also Paul Rose, Common Agency
and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1361 n.17 (2010) (citing Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).  As explained by Profes-
sor Rose:
Under a classic theory of the firm, agency costs in the corporate context
increase as ownership is separated from control.  As the manager’s owner-
ship of shares in the firm decreases as a percentage of the total, the man-
ager will bear a diminishing fraction of the costs of any nonpecuniary
benefits he takes out in maximizing his own utility.  To prevent the man-
ager from maximizing his utility at the expense of the shareholders,
shareholders will seek to constrain the manager’s behavior by aligning
the manager’s interests with the shareholders’ interests.
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
96. Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Control and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8
HARV. BUS. L. REV. (manuscript at 4) (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619462 [https://perma.cc/Y3YQ-UQ6F].
97. Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6, at 602.
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ten or fifteen years) unless their extension is approved by shareholders
unaffiliated with the controller.”98  In this way, companies can avoid the
“elderly leader problem,” a situation that occurs when an elderly leader is
perceived to lack the competence to hold voting control,99 and the prob-
lem of the “idiot heir.”100
B. The Snap Inc. IPO
Yet, stock market investors have been very willing to ignore the “po-
tential” issues that are associated with the dual class share structure, even
to the point of investing in dual class share structures where the ordinary
shares have no voting rights and barely any sunset provisions.  For
example,
Snap [Inc.] went public [on March 2, 2017] with a three-class
capital structure: Class A non-voting shares (listed on the
[NYSE] . . .), Class B [regular voting shares] (unlisted, held by
management and early investors . . . ) and Class C [super-voting
shares] (unlisted, held by the two co-founders, 10 votes per
share, representing 88.6% of Snap’s total voting power).101
The lack of voting rights in the Snap Inc. offering was a first for an
IPO with a dual class share structure even though Google and Under Ar-
mour had previously offered shares with no voting rights in secondary
public offerings.102  Even though the Snap Inc. shares sold to the public
did not come with voting rights or much of a sunset provision (voting
rights would attach only upon the death of its two founders who at the
time of the IPO were both in their twenties), the offering was received by
the investor community with great enthusiasm.103  Snap Inc. priced its
IPO at $17 per share, giving it a market valuation of roughly $28.3 bil-
lion.104  “The order book was more than 10 times oversubscribed, and
Snap could have priced the IPO at a price up to $19 a share . . . .”105
Most importantly, the initial investors in Snap Inc.’s IPO were not
passive, uninformed index fund investors—since the Snap non-voting
shares have yet to be included in an index—but were mainly sophisticated
investors who can be referred to as “information traders.”106  The informa-
98. See id. at 590.
99. See id. at 605.
100. See id.
101. Descovich et al., supra note 33.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Michael Greene, Snap IPO Gets Investors Fired up over Dual-Class
Stock, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 9, 2017), www.bna.com/snap-ipo-gets-n579820849
63/ [https://perma.cc/J3R9-HV9F].
104. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 56.
105. Id.
106. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006).
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tion trader is “willing and able to devote resources to gathering and analyz-
ing information as a basis for his or her investment decisions.”107
Information traders look for differences between value and price based on
the information they possess and “then trade to capture the value of their
informational advantage.”108  Information traders move security prices to-
ward their fundamental values and are in essence “the agents who render
markets efficient.”109  Given the lack of voting rights, we should also ex-
pect the purchasers to be “value investors.”  A value investor is a special
type of information trader that devotes “[w]hatever limited time, re-
sources, and skill they have to . . . valuation,” and basically lets other inves-
tors worry about voting, trying to gain control of the company, or investing
in recommendations on how to correct managerial inefficiencies.110
The list of value investors that have purchased Snap Inc. shares dur-
ing or soon after the IPO includes mutual fund(s) actively managed by
Blackrock Inc., the mega-mutual fund advisor (9.4 million shares).111
This is somewhat ironic, as its investment stewardship team, the unit that
speaks out on corporate governance issues on behalf of Blackrock Inc., has
been very outspoken in its criticism of dual class share structures.112
Other information traders who have invested in Snap shares include: NBC
Universal, a unit of Comcast Corp., who invested $500 million in the Snap
Inc. IPO (approximately 29.4 million shares),113 Third Point LLC (2.25
million shares), and Jana Partners LLC (550,000 shares); investment
banker and asset manager, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (1.1 million
shares); and large asset managers such as Soros Fund Management, LLC
107. Id. at 723.
108. See id. at 726.
109. See id. at 719.
110. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 67, at 1033.
111. See, e.g., Jennifer Ablan et al., High-Profile Snap Stackholders Revealed in Fil-
ings, REUTERS (May 12, 2017, 06:25 PM), https://ca.reuters.com/article/technolo
gyNews/idCAKBN18830X-OCATC [https://perma.cc/XM2E-TGX2]; Noel
Randewich, Snap Surges After Wall Street Heavyweights Reveal Stakes, REUTERS (May 15,
2017, 01:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/snap-stocks-idUSL2N1IH0XV
[https://perma.cc/VR5W-R9G8].
112. See, e.g., Letter from Pru Bennett, Head of Investment Stewardship
APAC, Blackrock Inc., and Winnie Pun, Head of Public Policy APAC, Blackrock
Inc., to Singapore Exchange Limited (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.black
rock.com/corporate/en-co/literature/publication/singapore-exchange-limited-
possible-listing-framework-dual-class-share-structures-041317.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S8LG-3DX9] (encouraging the Singapore stock exchange not to list
dual class shares).
113. See, e.g., Adam Lashinsky, Why NBC Universal Got In on Snap’s IPO, FOR-
TUNE (Mar. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/06/why-nbc-universal-got-in-
on-snaps-ipo/ [https://perma.cc/NYP5-DHQJ] (reporting that NBC Universal in-
vested $500 million in the Snap Inc. IPO at $17 per share for an approximate stake
of 29.4 million shares).
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(approximately 1.7 million shares)114 and Och-Ziff Capital Management
(approximately 1 million shares).115
What is most interesting about this list of investors, besides the Black-
rock investment, is the notable appearance of two activist hedge funds:
Third Point LLC and Jana Partners LLC.  These investors usually find it
critical to hold significant amounts of voting stock, 5%–10% of the voting
shares outstanding, in order to have some foundation to at least threaten a
proxy contest if their recommendations are ignored by the target’s board.
But with their investment in Snap Inc. non-voting shares, they appear to
be taking on the role of value investor, not hedge fund activist.  It is also
noteworthy to mention that Third Point purchased 3 million shares of
Facebook worth approximately $426 million during the first quarter of
2017.116  Perhaps even without much or any voting power, Third Point
and Jana Partners still felt they could influence these companies when cir-
cumstances created a receptive environment for their advice.
In sum, there was no lack of institutional investor interest in the Snap
IPO.  This is consistent with the finding by Ronald Anderson et al. that
institutional investors hold 87.4% of the free float in dual class firms that
still have family members with voting power equal to or greater than
5%.117  Moreover, investors in the Snap IPO were not passive, uninformed
investors but those who can be described as value investors.
C. The Value of Private Ordering
Why would value investors in Snap’s IPO be so tolerant of a unique
corporate governance arrangement—a dual class share structure with
non-voting shares—that so obviously increases the potential for agency
costs?  There are two reasons: the wealth-maximizing efficiency that results
from the private ordering of corporate governance arrangements, and the
understanding that agency costs are not the only costs of governance that
need to be minimized.
An understanding of private ordering begins with Michael Jensen and
William Meckling’s famous description of an organization as a “legal fic-
tion” that serves “as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among
individuals.”118  How those contracting relationships are shaped “de-
114. See, e.g., Jennifer Ablan, Soros Fund Management Ups Goldman Stake, Buys
Snap Shares in First Quarter, REUTERS (May 15, 2017, 06:42 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-investment-funds-soros/soros-fund-management-ups-gold
man-stake-buys-snap-shares-in-first-quarter-idUSKCN18B2PB [https://perma.cc/
6WGS-DBY2].
115. See, e.g., Ablan et al., supra note 108.
116. See Third Point LLC, Form 13F Information Table (Form 13F) (May 12,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040273/00010851461700
1247/xslForm13F_X01/form13fInfoTable.xml [https://perma.cc/AE4K-GVQY].
117. See Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 28.
118. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976)
(emphasis omitted).
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pend[s] on the outcome of the bargaining process that takes place between
the contracting parties.”119  This bargaining process in the context of cor-
porate governance arrangements is referred to as private ordering.
Private ordering is considered efficient and desirable because it allows
for the implementation of market-driven corporate governance arrange-
ments.120  That is, it “allows the internal affairs of each corporation to be
tailored to its own attributes and qualities, including its personnel, culture,
maturity as a business, and governance practices.”121  In effect, “observed
governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between
shareholders and management.”122
Shareholders, the sole claimants to the residual cash flows generated
by the firm, would argue that because they are the least contractually pro-
tected versus other parties, they deserve shareholder wealth maximization
as the gap filler in their corporate contract.123  That is, they are the parties
to the corporate contract that have the greatest risk of ending up with
nothing as a result of their dealings with the corporation.  The reason
other stakeholders would support a board and executive management
targeting shareholder wealth maximization is because all other parties that
have contracted with the corporation must be paid off prior to the share-
holders receiving a residual, if any.124  Moreover, as stated by Henry
Manne, the result of shareholder wealth maximization being the corpo-
119. See Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties As Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1266, 1272 (1999) (emphasis added).
120. According to Macey,
[B]ecause informal norms generate outcomes that are generally welfare-
enhancing, while law at best generates outcomes that are mixed (and tend
strongly towards the welfare-reducing), informal norms should come with
a strong presumption of legitimacy.  Formal legal rules are likely to be
inefficient at best and amorally redistributive at worst.  Thus, under a
wide range of circumstances, such as when society is interested in maxi-
mizing utilitarian considerations, and when society is interested in resolv-
ing standard legal disputes within groups, lawmakers are unlikely to
improve upon the customary rules the group develops through voluntary,
private interaction.
Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and
Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1140–41 (1997) (emphasis
added).
121. Troy A. Paredes, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments
Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (May 20, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.
htm [https://perma.cc/H3VJ-P5C5].
122. David Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation,
101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 431 (2011).
123. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corpo-
rate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 579 (2003).
124. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991) (“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors as-
sists the other ‘constituencies’ automatically.”).
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rate objective is an example of “pure positive economics”125 and should be
accepted as such.
It is also important to note that public companies overwhelmingly
take the corporate form so they can take advantage of the private ordering
that corporate law allows.  Corporate law enables private ordering by pro-
viding default, not mandatory, rules.126  For example, Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL) section 212(a) provides for a default rule of one
share, one vote.127  However, DGCL section 151(a) allows for the use of
dual class share structures if provided for in the company’s certificate of
incorporation.128  Moreover, state corporate law and its provision for pri-
vate ordering are not expected to be interfered with by federal law.  As the
Supreme Court has said, “ ‘[c]orporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation.’”129  As such, “[t]he voting rules are considered
to be a matter of private contract between the firm and its various types of
investors.”130
Most significantly, private ordering under corporate law is not a free-
for-all.  It is a structured approach that purposefully selects the board to
take the lead in determining the optimal corporate governance arrange-
ments.  According to Michael Klausner,
The contractarian theory of the firm . . . implies a theory of the
role of corporate law: corporate law should merely provide a set
of default rules that managers may adopt on behalf of their firms,
while leaving managers free to customize their companies’ char-
ters with legally enforceable rights and obligations.131
Board-initiated private ordering of governance arrangements is an ap-
plication of the most important default rule under corporate law,132 the
125. E-mail from Henry G. Manne, Professor Emeritus of Law, George Mason
Univ., to Bernard S. Sharfman, Visiting Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve
Univ. Sch. of Law (Sept. 16, 2012, 09:16 PM) (on file with author).
126. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, the
Delaware General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leaves latitude
for substantial private ordering, provided the statutory parameters and judicially im-
posed principles of fiduciary duty are honored.” (emphasis added)).
127. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (West 2017).
128. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a).
129. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1997) (quoting Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
130. Fischel, supra note 22, at 120.
131. Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006).
132. Although default rules can be modified, “the default rule is tailored to-
ward what the legislature believes most, but not all, of an organization’s stakehold-
ers would have agreed to if contracting were efficient.” See James D. Cox, Corporate
Law and the Limits of Private Ordering 7 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
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rule that provides the board with ultimate decision-making authority.  For
example, under Delaware corporate law, “[t]he business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”133  “On its
face, that statutory [rule] . . . provid[es] the board with unlimited manage-
rial authority,” subject only to the limitations imposed by judicial eq-
uity.134  “Public companies never substantively modify the default rule,
and [its] lack of modification . . . needs to be acknowledged as the first
and most fundamental step in such a company’s private ordering
process.”135
The default rule is so universally [accepted] . . . that it most likely
could have been written as a mandatory rule without significantly
restricting the contracting parties’ abilities to enter into private
ordering.  That is, if . . . a bargaining process [truly] goes on
between contracting parties in a public company, then there
seems to be overwhelming support for allowing the Board to re-
tain [ultimate decision-making] authority.136
Superior decision-making efficiency and the expected result of share-
holder wealth maximization “is the rationale that explains why the [out-
come of the] bargaining process always allows DGCL § 141(a) to be
incorporated without . . . modification into a public company’s charter”
and that by extension allows the board to control the private ordering of
corporate governance arrangements, including the decision of whether or
not to use a dual class share structure when going public.137  Corporate
law concentrates ultimate decision-making authority in the board because
lawmakers recognize that a centralized, hierarchical authority is necessary
for the successful management of a public company that can become ex-
tremely large in size.138  In sum, what is desired by the contracting parties
Series No. 2015-47, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2671850 [https://perma.cc/8Z2K-ZAEP].
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
134. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 14
N.Y.U J.L. & BUS. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888052 [https://perma.cc/7A9B-PJD3].
135. Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and Empirical Evidence Tell Us About
Proxy Access, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2017); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business
and affairs of the corporation.”).
136. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension Between Hedge Fund Activism and Corpo-
rate Law, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 251, 264 (2016).
137. See id.
138. According to Robert Clark, hierarchies in large organizations lead to the
“facilitation of cooperation in the carrying out of large-scale tasks.” See ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 801 (1986) (emphasis omitted).  According to
Kenneth Arrow, information scattered over a large organization must be both
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in terms of decision-making can be summarized in the following statement
by Stephen Bainbridge: “Preservation of managerial discretion should al-
ways be the null hypothesis.”139
D. Why Shareholders Agree to the Dual Class Share Structure
Through the bargaining process, the dual class share structure arises.
Again, why would rational investors who purchase shares in an IPO volun-
tarily go beyond the default rules of corporate law and hand over control
to insiders, such as the founders, especially when it comes in the form of
no voting rights and nominal sunset provisions such as in the Snap Inc.
IPO?
The answer can be found in looking at an IPO with a dual class share
structure as a continuum of what has occurred prior to the IPO.  During
the time when a successful company is still in the pre-IPO phase but not
generating enough positive cash flow, if any, to meet its cash needs, it will
go through several rounds of private financing, including new equity fi-
nancing.  For example, Snap Inc. went through several rounds of larger
and larger pre-IPO financing that started with a small amount of seed
money provided by Lightspeed Venture Partners in 2012.140  Investors in
these later rounds of private funding included four Fidelity mutual funds
and T. Rowe Price.141  During each round of new financing, the issue of
filtered and transmitted to a centralized authority for a large organization to make
informed decisions and minimize error in decision-making. See KENNETH J. AR-
ROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974).  Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz argue that a centralized authority is necessary to eliminate the problems
associated with having a large number of shareholders:
If every stock owner participated in each decision in a corporation, not
only would large bureaucratic costs be incurred, but many would shirk
the task of becoming well informed on the issue to be decided, since the
losses associated with unexpectedly bad decisions will be borne in large
part by the many other corporate shareholders.  More effective control of
corporate activity is achieved for most purposes by transferring decision
authority to a smaller group, whose main function is to negotiate with
and manage (renegotiate with) the other inputs of the team.
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972).  As observed by Michael Dooley,
for companies with a large number of shareholders, it is much more efficient for
the board—the corporate actor that possesses overwhelming advantages in terms
of information, including nonpublic information—to make corporate decisions
than for shareholders or any other party that contracts with the corporation to do
so. See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 467
(1992).
139. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 109 (2004).
140. See Alex Konrad, Snap’s IPO Means a Huge Windfall for These VC Investors,
FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017, 06:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2017
/02/02/snap-ipo-means-big-windfall-for-early-snapchat-investors/#4c8168b1b414
[https://perma.cc/9SRB-J95F].
141. See Tim McLaughlin, Fidelity, T. Rowe Poised for Gains on Snap IPO,
REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2017, 01:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-ipo-
funds-idUSKBN16323B [https://perma.cc/SHL5-VSGJ].  Mutual funds, such as Fi-
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whether the founders or some other insiders would maintain voting con-
trol of the company needed to be addressed.  Assuming they maintained
control, it was the result of those investors providing the fresh round of
new private equity financing, agreeing with insiders that such control is
necessary in order for the company to flourish and for the value of their
investment to be maximized.
The investors who agree to insider control during the rounds of pri-
vate financing are not uninformed of the agency costs that could poten-
tially arise from allowing insiders to retain control.  They are, after all,
savvy investors who are able to seriously bargain with insiders on the issue
of continued control.  They are, or should be, the most informed of all
when it comes to understanding this particular company.
This same bargaining process continues when it is time for the
IPO.142  This process requires informed investors to consider the value of
having insider control and the costs of shareholder participation in corpo-
rate decision making, not just agency costs.  That is, it requires informed
investors to utilize a holistic calculus, not just a calculus based on agency
costs.  This holistic calculus is best understood in the context of Goshen
and Squire’s newly proposed principal-cost theory.143  This theory posits
that a firm’s optimal corporate governance arrangements result from the
minimization of total control costs as defined below:
[E]ach firm’s optimal governance structure minimizes the sum
of principal costs, produced when investors exercise control, and
agent costs, produced when managers exercise control.  Both prin-
cipal costs and agent costs can arise from honest mistakes (which
generate competence costs) and from disloyal conduct (which gen-
erate conflict costs).  When investors exercise control, they make
mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent,
thereby generating principal competence costs.  To avoid such
delity and Blackrock, have been increasing their investment in successful private
companies during the later rounds of their pre-IPO financing. See Sergey Cher-
nenko et al., Mutual Funds as Venture Capitalists? Evidence from Unicorns 2, 22,
38 fig.2, 39 fig.3 & 41 tbl.1 (Jan. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2897254 [https://perma.cc/L55M-
K9E4].
142. Although Uber already had a dual class structure in place, it will be inter-
esting to see if the management debacle at Uber, a company valued at up to $68
billion even though it has yet to go public, still leads to a dual class share structure
when and if it has an IPO. See, e.g., Heather Somerville, Uber CEO’s Iron Grip Poses
Challenge in COO Search, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2017, 07:09 AM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-uber-governance-idUSKBN17F1CO [https://perma.cc/RFA8-
P2DP].  An internal investigation of Uber found that the company was suffering
from a toxic work culture.  This led to the resignation of Travis Kalanick as Chief
Executive Officer even though he had significant voting power as the holder of
super-voting shares. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Inside Travis Kalanick’s Resignation as Uber’s
C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/tech
nology/uber-travis-kalanick-final-hours.html [https://perma.cc/BZ8T-PDG9].
143. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 28, at 767.
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costs, they delegate control to more competent managers. But
delegation separates ownership from control, leading to agent
conflict costs, and also to principal conflict costs to the extent that
principals retain the power to hold managers accountable.  Fi-
nally, managers themselves can make honest mistakes, generat-
ing agent competence costs.  Thus, the allocation of control rights in
a governance structure is aimed at minimizing total control costs
(i.e., the sum of all four categories).
Agent costs and principal costs are substitutes for each
other: Any reallocation of control rights between investors and
managers decreases one type of cost but increases the other.  The
rate of substitution is firm-specific, driven by factors such as busi-
ness strategy, industry, and the personal characteristics of the key
parties.  Therefore, each firm has a distinct division of control
rights that minimizes total control costs.  Because the cost-mini-
mizing division varies by firm, the optimal governance structure
does as well.  The implication is that law’s proper role is to allow
firms to select from a wide range of governance structures, rather
than mandating some structures and banning others.
Agency-cost essentialists focus on one of the four categories
of control cost we have identified: agent conflict costs.  They
downplay agent competence costs, and more important, they
largely disregard both types of principal cost.  Yet principal costs
are more fundamental than agent costs, as the goal of reducing
them is the reason that investors delegate control to managers,
generating the conflict costs that preoccupy agency-cost scholars.
A firm that seeks to maximize total returns will weigh principal
costs against agent costs when deciding how much control to al-
locate to managers and how much to restrict the power of inves-
tors to hold the managers accountable.144
This approach to identifying the optimal corporate governance ar-
rangement at a particular firm utilizes a calculus that seeks to minimize
total control costs.  Most importantly, it is a calculus that allows for the
fundamental value of authority in large organizations to be respected; af-
ter all, that is why shareholders delegate managerial authority to the board
and executive management in the first place.  According to Kenneth Ar-
row, when discussing the trade-off between authority and responsibility in
a large organization:
There is much to be done in the design of institutions to recon-
cile the values of responsibility and authority . . . .  To serve its
functions, responsibility must be capable of correcting errors but
144. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (May 8, 2017) (final emphasis
added), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/08/principal-costs-a-new-
theory-for-corporate-law-and-governance/ [https://perma.cc/8FPZ-7EGZ].
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should not be such as to destroy the genuine values of authority.
Clearly, a sufficiently strict and continuous organ of responsibility
can easily amount to a denial of authority.  If every decision of A
is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus
of authority from A to B and hence no solution to the original
problem.145
This calculus is also consistent with Bainbridge’s normative explana-
tion of his director primacy model of corporate governance: “As a norma-
tive theory of corporate governance, director primacy claims that resolving
the resulting tension between authority [the board and by delegation, ex-
ecutive management] and accountability [by shareholders] is the central
problem of corporate law.”146  The calculus also allows for the potential
for Bainbridge’s director primacy as a positive theory to be proven correct
for any particular firm: “As a positive theory of corporate governance, the
director primacy model strongly emphasizes the role of fiat—i.e., the cen-
tralized decisionmaking authority possessed by the board of directors.”147
In the context of Goshen and Squire’s calculus, Bainbridge is arguing that
principal costs will greatly outweigh agency costs when total control costs
are minimized.
Moreover, according to Michael Dooley, “Where the residual claim-
ants are not expected to run the firm and especially when they are many
in number (thus increasing disparities in information and interests), their
function becomes specialized to risk-bearing, thereby creating both the
opportunity and necessity for managerial specialists.”148  I previously
explained,
Especially where there are a large number of shareholders, it is
much more efficient, in terms of maximizing shareholder value,
for the Board and executive management—the corporate actors
that possess overwhelming advantages in terms of information,
including nonpublic information, and whose skills in the man-
agement of the company are honed by specialization in the man-
agement of this one company—to make corporate decisions
rather than shareholders.149
The need to protect the value of authority is at its optimum, and agent
competence costs at their lowest, when insiders, such as the founders, possess
an “idiosyncratic vision” of where the company should go at the time of
the IPO.150  Dual class share structures “provide[ ] the entrepreneur with
145. ARROW, supra note 135, at 77–78 (emphasis added).
146. Bainbridge, supra note 120, at 605.
147. Id.
148. Dooley, supra note 138, at 467.
149. Sharfman, supra note 64, at 817–18.
150. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vi-
sion, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 560 (2016).
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maximum ability to realize her idiosyncratic vision”151 and appears to be
an explanation for why this structure has been bargained for at Snap
(Evan Spiegel and Robert Murphy) and also at firms such as Berkshire
Hathaway (Warren Buffet), Alphabet (Larry Page and Sergey Brin),
Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), Alibaba (Jack Ma), and Comcast (Roberts
family).
According to Zohar Goshen and Assaf Hamdani, voting control allows
the entrepreneur “to retain control over management decisions to pursue
her idiosyncratic vision for producing above market returns.  That is, [vot-
ing] control enables entrepreneurs to capture the value that they attach to
the execution of their idiosyncratic vision.”152  Therefore, when share-
holders allow the bargaining to result in an IPO with a dual class share
structure, they are expressing their understanding that the “genuine val-
ues of authority” needs to be preserved and that the best way to minimize
total control costs is through the retaining of control by those insiders who
possess an idiosyncratic vision.  The protection of this idiosyncratic vision
more than compensates for an expected increase in agent conflict costs.
Once we start thinking in terms of minimizing total control costs, it
becomes easier to accept that allowing for the private benefits of control
associated with dual class share structures may actually be a contributing
factor to the long-term value of the firm.153  According to Albert Choi,
“the larger the private benefits of control, the more likely that the control-
ler will be locked-in with the firm for the long-term and care about the
firm’s long-run performance.”154  If so, then all shareholders should bene-
fit from this lock-in effect despite the agency costs that are also
generated.155
From the perspective of market participants, Bebchuk and Kastiel’s
expectation of rising agent competence and conflicts costs over time are most
likely minimized by the expectation that the potential for an erosion of
leadership skills and the development of a significant wedge, respectively,
may not occur for many years or decades into the future, if ever.  Exam-
ples include the long-term success of Warren Buffett at Berkshire
Hathaway and Brian Roberts at Comcast, LinkedIn being bought out by
Microsoft soon after its IPO, or a mid-stream conversion (post-IPO) of
super-voting shares to ordinary shares when the controllers believe it will
be wealth enhancing for them and other shareholders.156  In regard to a
151. See id. at 590.
152. See id. at 566 (emphasis omitted).
153. See Choi, supra note 96 (manuscript at 5–6).
154. Id. (manuscript at 6).
155. See id.
156. See, e.g., Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of
Common Stock into Dual Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. CORP. FIN.
342, 347 (2006) (finding that a sample of 178 controlled firms that went through a
process of recapitalization utilizing a dual class share structure from 1979 to 1998
earned “abnormal” positive returns).
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mid-stream conversion, Forest City Realty Trust, Inc.’s recent elimination
of its dual class share structure serves as an example.157  At Forest City, the
elimination was meant to create a corporate governance structure more in
line with other publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs), help-
ing to interest more investors who specialize in purchasing REITs.158  As a
result, the Ratner family, who controlled the company through the owner-
ship of super-voting shares, is voluntarily giving up voting control of the
company.159  Worthy of mention is that the change was spearheaded by an
activist hedge fund, Scopia Capital Management, who owned 8.4% of the
ordinary shares.160  Moreover, the odds of an elderly leader problem de-
veloping at a company like Snap Inc. look extremely remote.  For better or
worse, unexpected events unrelated to having a dual class share structure
can affect Snap and its young leadership in the many years between now
and when this issue may develop, making the risk of having such a result
very low if not de minimis.
In addition, the concern about the wedge may be overblown.  Accord-
ing to a recent empirical study by Anderson et al., “no evidence” was
found “of a significant relation between stock returns and the wedge sepa-
rating voting rights and cash flow rights.”161  However, what they did find
was that dual class shares yielded excess returns over a fifteen-year time
frame and “that single and dual class family firms with similar levels of
control exhibit similar excess returns, suggesting the premium centers on
family control rather than dual class shares.”162
Of course, the pricing of the IPO is central to allowing the private
ordering process to take place and moving the company toward the most
optimal corporate governance arrangements.  Utilizing a dual class share
structure when it does not minimize total control costs comes at a price to
both insiders and the company, encouraging them to use such a structure
only when it is truly value enhancing for all parties.  That is, the offering
price and future trading price of the stock will need to be adjusted down-
ward if the optimal corporate governance arrangements are not imple-
mented up-front.  If so, the wealth of the insiders in the form of company
stock may be significantly reduced, and the funds provided to the com-
pany in the IPO may be significantly less than what could have been
raised.  Conversely, the offering price in an IPO will be at its maximum
when total control costs are minimized.  Perhaps this is why IPOs with dual
157. See, e.g., Michelle Jarboe, Forest City to Eliminate Dual-Class Stock Structure,
Reduce Ratner Family’s Presence on Board, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 6, 2016, 06:28 PM),
http://realestate.cleveland.com/realestate-news/2016/12/forest_city_to_elimin
ate_dual-.html [https://perma.cc/UX2G-UZLT] (the stock jumped 9.8% on the
news).
158. See, e.g., id.
159. See, e.g., id.
160. See, e.g., id.
161. See Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 5.
162. See id.
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class share structures are still the exception to the rule, as the market pro-
vides sufficient incentives and penalties to make sure they are used only
when minimizing total control costs.
E. Summary
A dual class share structure allows for the continuation of the govern-
ance arrangements that existed prior to the IPO.  It also provides the foun-
ders the right to manage the company as if it were still private.  From the
perspective of agency costs, an IPO that incorporates such a structure has
many troubling aspects including being immune to the corrective mecha-
nisms found in the market for corporate control and hedge fund activism,
a “wedge” between voting and cash flow rights that can be become quite
extreme over time, and a value of leadership that may erode over time.
However, agency costs are not the only costs involved in determining a
firm’s optimal corporate governance arrangements.  As described by Go-
shen and Squire, principal costs, including actions by the shareholder em-
powerment movement that are intended to maximize shareholder wealth,
must also be considered, and the calculus involved in determining the op-
timal arrangements requires a focus on total control costs, not just agency
costs.
Most importantly, private ordering pressures a board to launch an
IPO with corporate governance arrangements that minimize these total
control costs.  If not, then the founders and the company face potentially
stiff financial penalties.  Moreover, the imprudent use of the dual class
share structure should not penalize the IPO investor.  According to
Fischel:
As a theoretical matter, initial public offerings of limited or non-
voting stock can never harm investors.  The price of a security
when a firm goes public reflects the value of that security to inves-
tors.  Investors only purchase a security when they estimate that
the value of whatever rights and cash flows it carries equals or
exceeds its price.  If investors value voting rights and a firm fails
to provide them, then the firm’s securities simply sell at a lower
price.  The organizers of the firm may be worse off, but investors
are not.163
Consistent with this statement, but also rationalizing the absence of
the market for corporate control, Ronald Gilson states:
A stock’s limited voting rights are reflected in a reduced price, so
that the company’s owners at the time it goes public, and not the
purchasers, bear the cost.  Shareholders are not fooled and there
is no reason to expect that third parties will be adversely affected.
163. Fischel, supra note 22, at 147.  Anderson et al. found a valuation discount
of approximately 12%. See Anderson et al., supra note 80, at 30.
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Although a company that goes public with a class of stock with
limited voting rights will be substantially sheltered from the mar-
ket for corporate control, this is not a change in status. The com-
pany also was not subject to the market for corporate control before it went
public.164
Gilson’s statement would appear to apply to hedge fund activism as
well.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is important to understand that while excellent arguments can be
made that the private ordering of dual class share structures must incorpo-
rate certain provisions, such as sunset provisions,165 it is an overreach for
academics and shareholder activists to dictate to sophisticated capital mar-
ket participants—the ones who actually take the financial risk of investing
in IPOs (including those with dual class share structures)—how to struc-
ture corporate governance arrangements.  Obviously, all the sophisticated
players in the capital markets who participate in an IPO with dual class
shares can read the latest academic articles on dual class share structures,
including the excellent new article by Bebchuk and Kastiel,166 and incor-
porate that information in the bargaining process without being dictated
to by parties who are not involved in the process.  If, as a result of this
bargaining, the dual class share structure has no sunset provision and per-
haps even no voting rights in the shares offered, then we must conclude
that these terms were what the parties required in order to get the deal
done, with the risks of the structure being well understood.
It is just as important to closely scrutinize arguments that would dis-
rupt this private ordering in order to meet non-wealth maximizing objec-
tives.  For example, the argument that this private ordering must be
disrupted in order to make sure that index funds are not ultimately forced
to hold non-voting or less equal voting shares in their portfolios.  While
excluding dual class shares would potentially serve the non-wealth maxi-
mizing purposes of those institutions that make up the shareholder em-
powerment movement, the vast bulk of index fund investors would be
harmed because they would be denied the opportunity to invest in the
excluded stocks.  Without the inclusion of dual class shares, the index
funds would be less representative of what they are trying to represent.167
For example, it would be hard to imagine investing in an S&P 500 index
fund without the inclusion of such companies as Alphabet, Facebook,
164. Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Sub-
stitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (1987) (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 6, at 617–21.
166. See generally id.
167. See, e.g., Alex Bryan, Unintended Biases in ESG Index Funds, MORNINGSTAR
(July 6, 2016), http://www.morningstar.com/advisor/t/115903938/unintended-
biases-in-esg-index-funds.htm [https://perma.cc/QE3V-ZKRJ].
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Comcast, Alibaba, Berkshire Hathaway, and Snap Inc.  Given that these
and similar companies fuel the growth in the value of our stock markets,
their absence would greatly challenge the benefit of having such indexes
in the first place.  It would be even worse for those investors who are in-
vesting in an index of technology stocks that exclude dual class shares be-
cause technology stocks rely more heavily on dual class share structures.
Moreover, index funds cater to liquidity traders, traders “who buy and
hold a portfolio of stocks based on consumption/saving considerations
independently of general market or firm-specific information.”168  They
are the ultimate non-information trader who sees little or no value in the
ability to vote.169  What value would such exclusions have to these
investors?
Ironically, investors could ultimately have access to excluded stocks,
but they would be forced to include them through direct purchases or
through higher cost actively managed mutual funds that allow for such
purchases.  Of course, the whole point of index funds is that passive, unin-
formed investors can avoid the costs of creating their own portfolios, the
search costs of identifying actively managed funds that can be expected to
earn excess returns, and the payment of high annual management fees.
A senior leader in the shareholder empowerment movement stated
that “ ‘[a]nybody who buys nonvoting shares is a nitwit.’”170  Obviously,
given the impressive list of information traders who have purchased Snap’s
non-voting shares, this insult is without foundation.  These investors may
at times incorrectly gauge the value of a particular stock, but they are far
from being nitwits.  Neither is it the kind of guidance needed to deter-
mine if a dual class share structure with or without voting shares yields the
optimal corporate governance arrangement.  The determination requires
analysis and above all else, bargaining, not a conclusory statement.  In-
stead, we need to follow the guidance of Fischel, the famous corporate law
scholar who had a clear vision of the role played by dual class shares in the
private ordering of corporate governance arrangements:
Some may argue that unequal voting rights are undesirable be-
cause they are inconsistent with the principle of “corporate de-
mocracy.”  This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed.  All
firms, including corporations, consist of contractual relationships
168. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 106, at 714.
169. See id. at 721–23.  Non-information traders also include: insiders such as
directors and executive management who have access to non-public information
but are significantly restricted in the trading of that information; noise traders who
invest based on fads, rumors or old information; and market makers, “professionals
who facilitate trading and maintain a market for securities by offering to buy or sell
securities on a regular basis.” See id. at 720–26.
170. See Matt Townsend & Michelle F. Davis, Why Under Armour CEO’s Power
Play Looks Like Bad Governance, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2015, 04:09 PM) (quoting
Nell Minow, vice chair of ValueEdge Advisors), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-06-16/why-under-armour-ceo-s-power-play-looks-like-bad-gover
nance [https://perma.cc/5CK5-5UAH].
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freely entered into by economic actors to maximize their joint
welfare.  Who has the right to vote and how and when the vote
can be exercised are rights that are typically allocated by con-
tract.  In contrast to governmental democracies—which are usu-
ally designed to serve broader goals than wealth maximization—
the optimal voting rules for any particular firm are those that maximize
its value.171
In sum, capital markets paternalism is not required when it comes to
IPOs with dual class share structures.
171. Fischel, supra note 22, at 140–41 (emphasis added).
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